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Highlights
￿ The Asian financial crisis (1997) and the European crisis (2009)
have both contributed to the development and deepening of regio-
nal safety net arrangements. This paper analyses the relationships
between global and regional financial safety nets, and uncovers the
potential tensions and operational challenges associated with the
involvement of several institutional players with potentially diffe-
rent interests, analytical biases and governance. The G20 has ack-
nowledged the importance of these new players for the international
monetary system, but the principles for cooperation between the
IMF and regional financing arrangements are far too broad and ad
hocto contribute to a coherent and effective architecture. This paper
tries to establish some lessons learned from the Asian financial cri-
sis in 1997 and the current European crisis in order to enhance the
effectiveness, efficiency, equity and governance of these arrange-
ments. In particular, it proposes changes to the IMF articles of agree-
ment to allow for lending or guarantees to regional arrangements
directly and it establishes some key desirable features and prac-
tices of regional mechanisms that should be adopted everywhere to
ensure some global consistency, particularly in the field of ma-
croeconomic surveillance, programme design and conditionality.
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refers to US dollars.The failings of the international monetary system in the 1970s and the rise of financial globalisation 
may well have increased the volatility of economic cycles (Rodrik 1997, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, 
Krugman 1991). In the last 20 years, the Asian crisis in 1997, the global financial crisis in 2008, and 
the European crisis in 2009 stand out as having been particularly deep and widespread, causing 
considerable loss in output in a number of countries. As a result, the demand for insurance against 
these shocks has grown and the shortcomings of the existing insurance mechanisms have been 
exposed. The Bretton Woods institutions, and in particular the International Monetary Fund (IMF), met 
these demands imperfectly, and as a result alternative insurance mechanisms – both national and 
regional – have been developed over the years.
Even though this process of regionalisation of monetary cooperation started in the 1970s, in recent 
years both the Asian crisis and more recently the European crisis have decisively contributed to the 
establishment of regional safety net arrangements as a necessary complement to international 
arrangements.   The   2008   global   financial   crisis   has   substantially   improved   the   pre-existing 
international financial safety net architecture to address financial crises with liquidity tools designed 
for pre-emptive actions. In addition, the central banking community has shown a remarkable ability 
during the crisis, albeit in an ad-hoc fashion, to coordinate currency swap arrangements in order to 
improve liquidity conditions and ensure appropriate circulation of key international reserve currencies 
when the financial system was failing to do so. Yet, those initiatives have by no means discouraged 
regionalisation.
Coexistence and joint interventions between regional financial safety nets and global financial safety 
nets, whether they be central bank currency lines or more standard IMF instruments, pose a number of 
important questions about their combined efﬁciency and effectiveness in ensuring the stability of the 
international monetary system. In particular, the actual cooperation between different levels of 
surveillance   and   financial   assistance,   conditionality   frameworks,   analytical   perspectives, 
accountability structures, and sometimes political objectives can lead to tensions that might 
undermine the potency of these safety nets and leave fragilities in the monetary system.
This paper reviews the evolution of the existing regional safety nets and compares their institutional 
framework and modes of operation. The aim is to identify challenges and highlight the existing and 
potential fault lines in their nascent architecture. The chapter proposes changes to both regional and international safety nets in order to improve their complementarity and subsidiarity and thereby 
maximise their effectiveness.
The rise of regional arrangements
The history and political economy of regional financial arrangements allow the establishment of two 
clear categories of regional arrangements that respond to two distinct but complementary sets of 
shortcomings in the international monetary system and global financial safety net architecture.
Two generations of regional financial cooperation
The first generation of regional arrangements rose in response to the emergence of cracks in the 
international monetary system (Figure 1). The end of the Gold Standard in 1971 and the economic 
shakeup created by the oil shock in 1973-74 raised new doubts and fears across the world about the 
ability of the Bretton Woods institutions to fulfil their role. They had indeed not been designed to 
deliver financial safety nets in a world of acute monetary instability. The creation of regional 
arrangements is clearly tied to this. In Europe, the Werner Plan, for example, was first and foremost 
designed to respond to global monetary instability and ended up with the creation of the “European 
currency snake” and the European Medium-Term Financial Assistance in 1971. Such regional 
responses emerged across the world, with the Arab Monetary Fund created in 1976, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Swap Arrangement in 1977, and the Latin American Reserve Fund 
(established as the Andean Reserve Fund) in 1978.
In many ways, regional monetary cooperation was first and foremost a response to global monetary 
instability and was primarily designed to contain its effect on the European continent (James 2013, 
Mourlon-Druol 2012). Several waves of devaluation, the Werner Report, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, 
and the Committee of Central Bankers eventually kick-started the process that effectively embedded 
monetary cooperation in the monetary uniﬁcation process. However, the 2009-10 European crisis 
would come to challenge the idea that a single currency would allow monetary stability without the 
need for regional financial arrangements outside a common central bank.
In Latin America, the creation of the Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo Latinoamericano de 
Reservas, or FLAR), established initially in 1978 as the Andean Reserve Fund (Fondo Andino de Fondo 
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Figure 1: Evolution of regional arrangements to date
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; EEC = European Economic Community; EURASEC = Eurasian Economic Community
a. In 1988 the Medium-Term Financial Assistance and Community Loan Mechanism was merged into a single Medium-Term Financial Assistance Facility.
Source: Authors’ illustration.Reservas or FAR), was gradually expanded to a greater number of members. However, it is interesting 
to note that it never really evolved into a full-ﬂedged arrangement encompassing all of Latin America 
and in particular large countries like Mexico, Brazil, or Argentina
1.
The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), which was initially the monetary incarnation of the Arab League, was 
established in 1976 with the political objective of gradually creating a single currency, which never 
happened. As Pierre Van den Boogaerde (1991) showed, the initial objective and the central ﬁnancing 
role of the AMF were largely diluted by a number of alternative ﬁnancing vehicles that provided other 
forms of balance of payments assistance to countries of the region.
The second generation of regional financial arrangements – which includes the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI), the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF), and the European regional 
financial safety nets – was the result of regional financial crises after the 1980s in a number of places, 
starting with Latin America. The regionalisation wave of the late 1990s was largely driven first by the 
precedent created by the IMF programme for Mexico in 1995 and then by the consequences of the 
Asian crisis in 1997. Mexico planted an important seed with the North American Framework Agreement 
(NAFA), which made an important contribution to the overall Mexican programme
2. In reality, this was 
more of a bilateral support than a truly regional initiative, but it established the need to go beyond 
standard IMF support and explains at least partially why the Latin American crises of the 1980s didn’t 
lead to a deepening and broadening of the regional arrangement in Latin America itself.
This had important consequences globally and in Asia in particular, where dependence on the IMF, and 
the goodwill of the United States as the key power-broker on its Executive Board, became evident and 
of concern. According to Phillip Lipscy (2003), the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund was first ﬂoated by 
Japanese authorities in late 1996. Doubtful about the US commitment to Asia, Japanese authorities 
took the lead in forging an “Asian consensus” on the issue. The plan then was to set up a fund with 
1 Several conjectures can be made owing to both politics and economics. Mexico probably became so integrated with the 
United States that it came to enjoy, especially after the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement, a special 
relationship with the United States that ensured a form of bilateral solidarity that would surely surpass any regional 
arrangement. Brazil and Argentina always entertained somewhat rival relations, which didn’t help a joint initiative, and they 
were both large enough to be the natural anchor of the regional system but potentially economically too fragile to risk the 
undertaking. As a result, FLAR remained a relatively limited initiative for small countries. But this is slowly changing and 
there are increasing discussions for Mexico and others to now join and expand it (Lombardi 2012).
2 NAFA was established in April 1994, enlarging prior bilateral swap agreements among Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States. The agreement serves as the rubric for the separate bilateral agreements. The Exchange Stabilization Fund, an 
intervention device of the US Treasury, also maintains a credit line with Mexico that requires a letter of comfort by the IMF 
managing director when used.resources amounting to $100 billion to be shared by the 10 interim member economies
3. In reality, 
this was not very consensual until the Asian crisis hit in 1997 and profoundly changed the terms of the 
debate. The political rejection of the IMF programmes and deep-seated criticism of its programme 
conditionality (IMF 2003) contributed to increasing the focus on the liquidity dimension of the Asian 
crisis, which motivated the establishment of preemptive and regional instruments.
Asia’s sour experience with the IMF created an economic and political shock that called for a bold 
initiative to strengthen supplementary and alternative methods of cooperation in addressing financial 
crisis outside of the IMF. The original Asian Monetary Fund proposal didn’t prosper because of political 
concerns surrounding the role of the yen in this regional arrangement. Instead, a series of bilateral 
swap arrangements was originally formed among the ASEAN-5 – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand – and the Plus Three countries – Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)
4. This was the beginning of a more ambitious and competing form of 
regionalisation that would come to be expanded quite meaningfully not only in Asia but also, in 
another form, and at a later stage, in Europe.
The Asian and European experiences
Asia
The embryo of an Asian regional safety net arrangement has existed since 1977, when the ﬁve 
founding members of the ASEAN signed the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA)
5. Following the Asian 
crisis and after aborted discussion on the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, Japan launched the 
New Miyazawa Initiative in October 1998 amounting to about $35 billion, which was targeted at 
stabilising the foreign exchange markets of Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand
6. The initiative was particularly valuable in containing instability in Malaysia’s financial 
sector, since that country had refused an IMF Stand-By Arrangement. The Japanese manoeuvre was 
deemed somewhat mutinous, since the IMF was very critical of Malaysia’s approach. But it also 
3 The PRC; Hong Kong, China; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Australia; Indonesia; Malaysia; Singapore; Thailand; and the 
Philippines.
4 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam joined the regional 
arrangements with the other ASEAN countries in 2000 and with the Plus Three countries with the establishment of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization in 2008.
5 The founding members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
6 The 'old' Miyazawa initiative was a 1987 proposal by Japan’s Minister of Finance Miyazawa Kiichi to resolve the debt crisis 
in Latin America that involved expanding the roles of the IMF and the World Bank in international financial affairs. While the 
Brady Plan was favored over Miyazawa’s, some of its vital provisions were patterned after the latter (Horisaka 1989).cemented the idea that Asia could gather enough resources to sandbag itself during a crisis period so 
long as Asian countries were united and managed to roll out timely and credible support mechanisms.
In Asian countries under IMF programmes, the conditionality associated with the loans included 
severe ﬁscal cuts, deep structural reforms, and substantial increases in interest rates to stabilise 
currency markets. The economic and social cost of the adjustment was so high and abrupt that it 
provoked social unrest in a number of countries. This would reverberate strongly in the months that 
followed and leave a lasting scar in relations between Asian countries and the IMF
7.
This experience fuelled both a willingness to self-insure through accelerated reserve accumulation and 
to strengthen regional arrangements to reduce the reliance on global financial safety nets. Building on 
this lesson, the CMI was formalised in May 2000 during the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting
8. It 
largely built on the original ASA and bilateral swap agreements involving the PRC, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea but was grounded in a broader programme that also included developing Asia’s local 
currency bond market and introduced a regional economic review and policy dialogue to enhance the 
region’s surveillance mechanism (Kawai and Houser 2007). The initiative included the new ASEAN 
members, increasing the total number of parties to the arrangement from 5 to 10. Table A.1 in the 
appendix highlights the evolution of the CMI.
The question of cooperation between the CMI and the IMF quickly became quite heated, with a number 
of countries arguing that strong ties to the Fund would defeat the initial purpose of the initiative (Korea 
Institute of Finance, 2012), but the ties were kept nonetheless both to mitigate moral hazard 
(Sussangkarn, 2011) and to ensure some consistency with conditionality attached to the IMF’s own 
programmes.
After the formal creation of the CMI in 2000, the era of Great Moderation that followed to some degree 
doused further ambitions to strengthen regional arrangements. As a result, when the global financial 
crisis hit in 2008, the Asian regional financial safety net proved too modest to play a meaningful role. 
7 In the case of Indonesia, the government’s tight ﬁscal position forced it to cut back on subsidies on food and fuel. But with 
the reduction in government price support, food and fuel costs skyrocketed, resulting in weeks of social unrest in the 
country and the eventual resignation of President Suharto, who had held power for over three decades.
8 Earlier in 1997, the Manila Framework Group was established by 14 Asia-Paciﬁc and North American economies: Australia; 
Brunei Darussalam; Canada; the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; New Zealand; 
the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and the United States. The purpose of the framework was information exchange and 
surveillance, with support from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. But since it had no formal status 
and included both Asian and non-Asian economies, the framework proved to be ineffective as a regional surveillance forum 
and was terminated in 2004. ASEAN+3 meetings superseded the Manila Framework Group meetings (Moon and Rhee 
2012).Indeed, instead of seeking support under CMI, the Bank of Korea and the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore sought a swap agreement with the US Federal Reserve for some $30 billion each. The 
Republic of Korea concluded bilateral agreements with Japan and the PRC that were not related to the 
CMI. Similarly, Indonesia established separate bilateral swap lines with Japan and the PRC to shore up 
its crisis buffer and did not resort to the CMI for credit support (Sussangkarn, 2011).
The plan to consolidate the bilateral swap arrangements and form a single, more solid, and effective 
reserve pooling mechanism – which had initially been put forward by the ﬁnance ministers of the 
ASEAN+3 in May 2007 in Kyoto – was accelerated and evolved in several iterations before the ﬁnal 
version was laid out more than two years later. In December 2009, the CMI was multilateralised and 
the ASEAN+3 representatives signed the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Agreement, 
which effectively became binding on March 24, 2010 (BSP, 2012). These successive transformations 
have strengthened the initiative, but it remains largely untested. In addition, other aspects of any 
credible regional financial arrangement, such as surveillance capacity and coordination of some basic 
economic policies, remain relatively embryonic.
Europe
The history of European financial safety nets cannot be dissociated from the history of European 
monetary integration. With this perspective in mind, it dates back to the late 1960s and has been an 
ongoing debate to this day. The history of European political integration at every turn is marked by 
failed projects or actual mechanisms of financial solidarity, ranging from loose exchange rate 
arrangements to the project of a full-ﬂedged European Monetary Fund. The advent of the monetary 
union was precisely designed to reduce the need for financial safety nets within the euro area. But the 
architectural deﬁciencies of the euro area and the lack of internal transfers have required the 
establishment of alternative mutual insurance mechanisms since the onset of the euro crisis in 2010.
In 2008, when the global financial crisis hit, Hungary had accumulated important external imbalances 
and large foreign exchange exposures. It had to seek financial assistance almost immediately and 
initiated contacts with the IMF. The total absence of coordination with European authorities came as an 
initial shock because it showed that despite decades of intense economic, political, and monetary 
integration, EU countries could still come to require international financial assistance. The experience 
pushed European institutions to unearth a forgotten provision of the Maastricht Treaty to provide financial assistance through the Balance of Payments Assistance Facility
9. This created preliminary 
and at first ad-hoc coordination between the IMF and the European Commission, which was then 
rediscovering design and monitoring of macroeconomic adjustment programmes.
Despite the rapid use of this facility and the emergence of a framework of cooperation with the IMF, 
contagion from the global financial crisis continued for months and prompted some Eastern European 
leaders to seek broader and more pre-emptive support
10, which failed. However, beyond ofﬁcial sector 
participation, there was a relatively rapid realisation that cross-border banking and financial 
retrenchment could become a major source of financial disruption and effectively propagate the crisis 
further – including back to the core of Europe, as large European banks were heavily exposed to 
Eastern Europe through vast and dense networks of branches and subsidiaries. In response, in late 
February 2009, under the leadership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World Bank decided to establish what was known 
as the Vienna Initiative. This was designed as a joint multilateral and private sector coordination and 
enforcement mechanism to reduce the risk of banking sector sudden stops. In particular, it compelled 
cross-border European banks to continue to provide appropriate liquidity to their branches and 
subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. The formalisation of such an arrangement
11 quite early in 
the crisis has certainly proven the case for coordination of financial institutions in emerging-market 
economies, especially when a relatively small number of institutions have a disproportionate impact 
on capital ﬂows.
But with the crisis spreading to the euro area, starting with Greece in the fall of 2010, new regional 
arrangements proved necessary. The lack of instruments forced European ofﬁcials to first consider 
bilateral assistance from member states. The idea of involving the IMF was initially violently rejected 
9 The possibility of granting mutual assistance to a member state with difﬁculties with its balance of payments is laid down 
in Article 143 of the treaty. The facility to provide medium-term financial assistance was established by Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 332/2002. The maximum amount of the facility was increased to €25 billion in December 2008 and further to €50 
billion in May 2009 (from €12 billion originally).
10 The Hungarian prime minister, in particular, tried to draw his peers and European leaders together to set up large 
international support for Eastern Europe. His proposal was eventually turned down by an informal European Council 
meeting on March 1, 2009, for lack of support by his peers. (The Czech Republic and Poland in particular feared the stigma 
associated with such an initiative.) See Balazs Penz and Agnes Lovasz, “Hungary Seeks $230 Billion Eastern Aid; World 
Bank Raises Funds,” Bloomberg News, February 27, 2012, www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aPVyz3WPsLZw (accessed on July 13, 2013).
11 The Joint International Financial Institutions initiative was announced on February 25, 2009, with a combined 
commitment of €25 billion. It was subsequently increased, but only a small portion of these funds were actually committed 
and disbursed. For a ﬁnal report on the initiative, see De Haas et al. (2012).on intellectual and political grounds
12 but proved inevitable. In a number of successive iterations, more 
solid regional arrangements were designed (Bijlsma and Vallée 2012). Table A.2 in the appendix 
shows the evolution of European regional financial safety nets.
The new international and regional safety net architecture
Following the momentum created by the Asian crisis and the bold call for the establishment of an Asian 
regional financial safety net, the Group of Seven (G-7) tried in 1998 to reform the monetary system by 
improving the provision of liquidity ex ante. This brought deep changes at the IMF, following what was 
called the Summers Call
13. It led to the creation of a set of new facilities that speciﬁcally addressed 
capital account crises (the Supplemental Reserve Facility and the Contingent Credit Line, for instance), 
which for lack of use were retired in 2004. These instruments were sorely missed in 2008 when the 
crisis hit, but the intellectual work had been done in the late 1990s and therefore under emergency 
conditions the approach to global financial safety nets was quickly and profoundly overhauled. This 
included two essential but somewhat independent moves: a profound redesign of the IMF toolkit and 
an extraordinary extension of global currency swap lines between central banks. These instruments 
could have largely addressed shortcomings of the international monetary system that the regional 
arrangements were striving to overcome, but they did not.
Revamped global financial safety nets
Central Bank Currency Swap Arrangements. Central banks played an important role very early during 
the financial crisis, overcoming their dramatic hesitations dating to the 1930s. They not only acted 
with rapid non-standard expansionary actions but also displayed a high degree of cooperation and 
coordination that clearly helped in allaying market stress by ensuring that widespread access to 
liquidity contained the worst effects of financial distress. Without determined action, it is not clear that 
IMF facilities, given the resources available then, could have prevented full-blown banking and balance 
of payments crises in a number of advanced and emerging economies.
12 European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet and Executive Board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi were among 
those most opposed to involving the IMF in the euro area.
13 Lawrence Summers, “Priorities for a 21st Century Global Financial System,” remarks at Yale University, New Haven, CT, US 
Department of the Treasury press release, September 22, 1999, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/ls111.aspx (accessed on July 1, 2013).Because of the central role of the dollar in the international financial system, the US Federal Reserve 
played a pivotal role in the establishment and expansion of these agreements. It agreed to a first 
temporary reciprocal currency arrangement with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss 
National Bank (SNB) in December 2007 for $20 billion and $4 billion, respectively. Access to dollar 
liquidity in Europe had become difﬁcult as early as the summer of 2007 following the decision by a 
large European bank to freeze assets on some funds it could not value properly for lack of liquidity in 
the US mortgage market. This first arrangement was gradually expanded in size and scope as market 
stress deepened and eventually covered 14 central banks and represented some $620 billion in 
outstanding volumes. Note that after October 2008, the Federal Reserve agreed to full allotment 
auctions for the four leading central banks: ECB, SNB, Bank of Japan (BOJ), and Bank of England (BOE), 
effectively giving unlimited dollar liquidity to these counter-parties.
Interestingly, these swap arrangements were extended to some key emerging-economy central banks 
(Banco de Mexico, Banco Central do Brasil, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Bank of Korea) prior 
to the creation of the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL). The countries were selected on the basis of their 
economic fundamentals because these arrangements had no conditionality, and considering their 
importance as regional financial hubs capable of playing an important role in the financial stability of 
their respective regions.
Linda Goldberg, Craig Kennedy, and Jason Miu (2010) have demonstrated the effectiveness of these 
arrangements in allaying funding pressures internationally. William Allen and Richhild Moessner 
(2010) have also shown the extent to which these arrangements were targeted precisely to those 
countries that were facing the biggest challenges, as indicated by currency mismatches in their 
financial systems’ balance sheets. However, little has been said of other bilateral swaps like those 
provided by the ECB or the PRC. The ECB’s foreign exchange swaps were remarkably modest and in 
some cases (e.g., Poland and Hungary) replaced by liquidity operations against eligible euro collateral 
rather than real unsecured foreign exchange swap arrangements like those the Federal Reserve 
extended. The PRC’s bilateral swap arrangements came later but became substantial in size and scope. 
However, they quickly appeared to be designed to serve the more medium-term objective of promoting 
the use of the renminbi in bilateral trade rather than addressing short-term liquidity and financial 
stability concerns (Rhee and Sumulong, 2013).IMF Lending Toolkit. Broadly speaking, the overhaul of the previous IMF credit support system was 
driven by two new important events. The first was the realisation that financial crises not only were 
affecting emerging economies but also could wreak havoc in large advanced economies. As a result, 
the financial support needed could be extremely large and could test the limits of IMF lending 
programmes. Second, it became clear that global imbalances and reserve accumulation for the 
purpose of self-insurance were a sign of deﬁance of the global financial safety net architecture that 
needed to be confronted. This doesn’t mean that excess reserve accumulation was only a response to 
deﬁciencies in the international monetary system as in many places it certainly served a mercantilist 
undertaking, but it forced to address global imbalances that would otherwise remain a permanently 
threatening feature of the global economy.
 
In April 2009, the London Group of Twenty (G-20) Summit jump-started a debate about a complete 
redesign of the IMF’s policies and crisis instruments. Further extensive deliberations were held during 
2010 and concluded with the G-20 Summit in Seoul. The Republic of Korea proposed the strengthening 
of global safety nets as one of its key priorities under its presidency (Rhee, 2011). Unlike in 1997, the 
recent liquidity crisis episode emanated from liquidity shortages in global banks, starting with those in 
the United States. Ironically, it was the Republic of Korea’s bilateral swap arrangement with the US 
Federal Reserve that eventually stabilised the domestic financial market. The Republic of Korea 
recognised the importance of having an ex ante crisis prevention mechanism and initially proposed 
the institutionalisation of swap lines as a major goal of strengthening the global safety net. Given the 
resistance it met, however, the Republic of Korea shifted its focus to strengthening the IMF lending 
toolkits.
The process of strengthening IMF lending toolkits and moving in the direction of ex ante crisis 
prevention instruments instead of an ex post crisis resolution mechanism unearthed a number of 
political and economic challenges, including moral hazard considerations, stigma, credibility, and 
ﬁnancing constraints. Despite these challenges, the IMF and the G-20 were able to agree, in a relatively 
short period of time, to triple the IMF’s lending capacity from $250 billion to $750 billion; devise and 
establish instruments that profoundly changed the existing IMF toolkit, particularly the creation of the 
FCL and then the Precautionary  Credit Line (PCL), which  was eventually  replaced with the 
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL); extend high access programmes; and extend special drawing 
rights (SDR) allocation of $250 billion. These combined measures were thought to clearly lay out the eligibility criteria and make them sufﬁciently stringent to reduce risks of moral hazard while also 
supporting potential “crisis bystanders.”
The FCL was made available in March 2009 mainly to serve member countries’ actual and imminent 
ﬁnancing needs. The PCL, on the other hand, was only formally offered in August 2010 to deal with the 
contingent ﬁnancing requirements of member countries (IMF, 2011). The PLL was introduced in 
November 2011 to replace and broaden the scope of the PCL (IMF, 2012). However, in the IMF’s own 
assessment, members using the new credit lines remained fairly limited, potentially because of the 
remaining stigma associated with their use (IMF, 2011).
Regional financial safety nets
This substantial strengthening of global financial safety nets, which addressed a number of 
shortcomings that regional arrangements had been trying to solve since the 1970s, could well have 
weakened the case for regional arrangements. But this did not happen and the distinctly European 
crisis that started in 2010 conﬁrmed maybe once and for all the need for a more decentralised safety 
net architecture relying on regionalism. Indeed, despite the many improvements to the global financial 
safety nets, their economic and political limitations justiﬁed stronger regional mechanisms. Table 1 
presents some key characteristics of existing regional financial safety nets.
Although the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was a latecomer, it appears to be the strongest of all 
existing regional arrangements in terms of legal basis, fund size, paid-in capital, and leverage capacity. 
Together with the ACF, European financial arrangements hold the distinction of being based on treaties, 
compared with the other regional arrangements that are based simply on agreements. The European 
financial arrangements also are the biggest, with the ESM and European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) having a combined lending ceiling of €700 billion as of July 2013, €80 billion of which is 
pledged by member states and the balance to be raised from capital markets. In terms of GDP, the ESM 
accounts for over 5 percent of members’ GDP, compared with less than 1 percent for the other regional 
financial arrangements (IMF, 2013a). Except for the ACF and CMIM, all the other regional arrangements 
have the option to issue bonds.
In terms of lending instruments, most regional financial arrangements offer loans, guarantees, and 
swaps. Maturities vary from short-term instruments (e.g., 30 days for the treasury credit offered by the Table 1: Key characteristics of existing regional financial arrangements
Regional financial arrangement
Number 
of 
members
Legal 
basis
Fund 
size
Paid-in 
capital/pledge
With 
option 
to 
issue 
bonds?
Instruments
Arab Monetary Fund (Middle East)  22  Agreement $2.7 
billion 
600 million Arab 
dinars 
Yes -Automatic loan
-Ordinary loan
-Extended loan
-Compensatory loan
-Structural Adjustment Facility
-Short-term liquidity 
Latin American Reserve Fund 
(Fundo Latino Americano de 
Reservas, FLAR)
7  Agreement  $3.28 
billion 
$2.28 billion  Yes  -Balance of payments credit
-Foreign debt restructuring
-Liquidity credit
-Contingent credit
-Treasury credit 
European Union Balance of 
Payments Facility 
27  Treaty  €50 
billion 
€50 billion  Yes  Loan/credit line 
Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (ASEAN+3)
13  Agreement  $240 
billion 
Pledge  No  -Swap, precautionary line
-Swap, stability facility
EURASEC Anti-Crisis Fund (Central 
Asia) 
6  Treaty  $8.513 
billion 
$8.513 billion  No  -Stabilization credit
-Sovereign loans
European Stability Mechanism (euro 
area) 
17  Treaty  €500 
billion 
€80 billion  Yes  -Loan
-Credit line (PCCL and ECCL)
-SMSF
European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (European Union)
27  Agreement  €60 
billion 
Backed by EU 
budget 
Yes  -Loan
-Credit line
European Financial Stability Facility 
(euro area) 
17  Agreement  €440 
billion
a
Yes  -Loan
-Credit line (PCCL and ECCL)
-SMSF
ASEAN+3 = Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea; SMSF = Secondary Market Support Facility; 
PCCL = Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line; ECCL = Enhanced Conditions Credit Line.
a.  Combined lending ceiling of the European Stability Mechanism and European Financial Stability Facility will be €700 billion in July 2013 with €80 billion pledged by member 
states and the balance to be raised from the capital markets.  
Source: Authors’ compilation.FLAR) to very long-term ones (up to 20 years for the low-income stabilisation credit offered by the 
ACF), depending on the objective and type of lending instrument. Interest rates are either ﬁxed or 
ﬂoating. Meanwhile, only the CMIM and ESM have ex ante crisis prevention facilities. In all regional 
financial safety nets, conditionality is usually mentioned, but not speciﬁed in detail. In fact, except for 
the CMIM and the European regional financial arrangements, linkage with the IMF is optional. For the 
CMIM, the IMF delinked portion was increased to 30 percent in 2012 with a view to increasing it to 40 
percent in 2014 subject to review should conditions warrant.
The mandate and capacity for surveillance also differ widely. The AMF undertakes no surveillance but 
has periodic consultations with members on their economic conditions. The FLAR introduced a 
macroeconomic surveillance programme in July 2011, which is in the process of being fully 
implemented. It includes monitoring of financial and banking stability conditions for use in providing 
advice to member countries. The CMIM, after incorporating the surveillance mechanism of ASEAN+3 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue in May 2005, established the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic 
Research Ofﬁce (AMRO) in April 2011 as an independent regional surveillance unit to monitor 
economic conditions of member economies, which will in turn have input into CMIM decision making. 
Similarly, the ACF has outsourced the surveillance function to the Eurasian Development Bank, which 
manages ACF funds. In the European Union, ESM surveillance complements the new framework for 
reinforced economic surveillance, which includes a stronger focus on debt sustainability and more 
effective enforcement measures, and focuses on prevention that should substantially reduce the 
probability of a crisis emerging in the future.
As regards fund utilisation, the CMIM remains the only arrangement untapped since its inception. The 
AMF has provided structural loans to Jordan, Morocco, and Mauritania. The FLAR has extended financial 
credit to Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The ACF has provided 
financial credit to Belarus and Tajikistan. The ESM is to be used in Cyprus for the first time, but the EFSF 
has been used for programmes in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Cooperation challenges and policy prescriptions
The evolving landscape of regional arrangements combined with profound changes to global financial 
safety nets poses the important question of cooperation. Indeed, both the IMF and the G-20 endorsed 
the use of regional arrangements and made them an integral, if shaky and uncertain, part of the global financial architecture. The International Monetary and Financial Committee first spoke of the 
importance for the IMF to cooperate with regional arrangements in October 2010. In November 2010, 
G-20 leaders asked G-20 ﬁnance ministers and central bank governors to explore “ways to improve 
collaboration between regional financial arrangements and the IMF across all possible areas” (G-20, 
2010). A set of broad and nonbinding principles were effectively delivered and endorsed during the 
Cannes G-20 Summit in the fall of 2011
14. Further work is under way and expected in the context of the 
Russian presidency of the G-20 with more concrete guidelines to be agreed upon during the G-20 
meeting of the leaders in St. Petersburg in the fall of 2013.
C. Randall Henning (2011) explained that the rationale for cooperation between regional and global 
arrangements essentially rested on the need to (1) limit risks of arbitrage between arrangements, 
especially in cases where they overlap; (2) avoid redundancy over and above what competition can 
justify; (3) align interest to ensure that resources are additive; and (4) organise some form of division 
of labour between institutions both in the conduct of surveillance and in programme monitoring and 
ﬁnancing. Building on these issues, we discuss key challenges related to cooperation and highlight a 
few policy prescriptions.
Strengthening existing global and regional arrangements
Before improving collaboration between global and regional financial safety nets, strengthening both 
regional and global arrangements might be an important prerequisite to ensure the stability of the 
international monetary system.
The global financial crisis brought important lessons to bear so as to improve tools and policies for 
global financial safety nets. The European crisis in particular, and the developments of its own safety 
nets through the crisis, also provides a testing case for regional safety nets globally.
Global arrangements
The divergences in approaches, purposes, and network and second-order effects of these foreign 
exchange swap arrangements beg the question of their governance. Indeed, they can be seen either 
14 The G-20 Cannes Communiqué states: “We have agreed on actions and principles that will help reap the beneﬁts from 
financial integration and increase the resilience against volatile capital ﬂows. This includes coherent conclusions to guide 
us in the management of capital ﬂows, common principles for cooperation between the IMF and Regional Financial 
Arrangements, and an action plan for local currency bond markets” (G-20 2011).as a substitute for the more ambitious high-access instruments provided by the IMF, or as a 
complement. But in both cases, devising effective global financial safety nets requires a degree of 
predictability that these ad hoc and discretionary arrangements do not offer. In addition, if the sense of 
emergency and responsibility was clearly present during the global financial crisis, one cannot rule out 
that under political pressure from the US Congress, for instance, the Federal Reserve would have been 
far more parsimonious, with potentially signiﬁcant consequences for financial stability globally.
In 2011, in preparation of the G-20 Seoul Summit, the IMF tried to argue that these bilateral and ad hoc 
foreign exchange swap lines should be multilateralised in order to increase their effectiveness and 
improve their governance. But these ideas have been met with great scepticism by the central banking 
community, which expressed reluctance and concern over seeing such operations with potential 
important implications for domestic monetary expansion handed over to governments sitting on the 
board of the IMF. However, this debate might not necessarily be closed forever, and alternative 
arrangements   for   coordinating   these   swap   arrangements,   while   respecting   the   autonomy, 
independence, and discretion of central banks, could be promoted.
Regional arrangements
Improve the Legal and Financial Structure. Legally, the CMIM is an institution based on agreements 
by member countries and has no identity under corporate law. As such, it is marred with legal 
uncertainty. The recent commitment by the ASEAN+3 economies to strengthen the CMIM, which was 
announced at the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ meeting in May 2013 in Delhi, is a welcome 
development. The agreement to involve central bank governors in CMIM decision making and to ensure 
the CMIM’s operational readiness is a positive development. In addition, work will continue “to consider 
ways to seek an effective cooperative relationship with the IMF and other multilateral financial 
institutions in the areas of surveillance, liquidity support arrangement and capacity development” 
(ASEAN, 2013). Financially, CMIM funding is based on pledges with no paid-in capital, unlike the case 
of the ESM, which is an intergovernmental treaty and has signiﬁcant paid-in capital. Due to this 
inherent weakness, the CMIM has been criticised as being untested, and there is constant suspicion 
that pledges might not be honoured promptly enough to prevent spillovers when a crisis starts. 
Securing a strong financial structure backed by meaningful paid-in capital seems to be the urgent step 
necessary to secure market conﬁdence in the CMIM.Improve Precautionary and Multi-country Lending Capacity. The stigma effect is not necessarily a 
unique problem for IMF loans. Even if swaps under the CMIM can have more ﬂexible conditionality, 
best efforts should be made to reduce the stigma effect, particularly on ex ante programmes. A few 
options have been considered to mitigate stigma, such as via a multi-country lending offer. By making 
unilateral and simultaneous offers of financial assistance to several countries with good policy track 
records (but with the capacity to propagate shocks), the CMIM could communicate to the public that 
the credit lines are provided for an ex ante crisis prevention purpose. The swap lines extended by the 
US Federal Reserve on October 29, 2008, to four countries – Brazil, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and 
Singapore – are good examples. The IMF also introduced the multi-country FCL in 2011. Multi-country 
swap offers could play a complementary role to that played by large central banks, but would have the 
advantage of being formally institutionalised compared with the ad-hoc nature of central bank swap 
lines. They would also be able to address more ﬂexibly members’ needs beyond central banks’ narrow 
mandates.
Improve Predictability. Once a crisis has started and the market is in panic, it will be difﬁcult to reverse 
market perceptions even by saying that programmes offered by regional financial safety nets are for 
prevention purposes. Markets are likely to focus only on negative news, and any indication that the 
CMIM is considering extending credit lines to a speciﬁc country could itself propagate a vicious circle. 
To avoid this, a pre-qualification system can be considered using a set of transparent “Maastricht-like” 
criteria particularly for the CMIM’s Precautionary Credit Lines. The pre-qualification criteria and the 
resulting list of eligible countries need not be made public. Assessing whether countries meet the pre-
qualification criteria can be done regularly and privately within the institution. A rule-based pre-
qualification mechanism would improve the effectiveness of the qualiﬁcation process and reduce the 
stigma effect.
Predicating qualiﬁcation for the multi-country swap offer on systemic importance and strong 
fundamentals, as well as on having offers of liquidity extended unilaterally and simultaneously to all 
qualiﬁed countries, would address the first-mover problem and reduce the stigma effect associated 
with accessing resources from the IMF.
Build Capacity for Surveillance. Surveillance capacity is critical for well-functioning regional financial 
arrangements. The AMRO was created to undertake surveillance that will support CMIM decision 
making. However, the organisation is still in an incipient stage. Currently, it needs more human capital and stronger research and monitoring capacities. These will take time. In the interim, the CMIM should 
tap the resources of international financial institutions in the areas of surveillance and capacity 
development.
 
Collaboration between the IMF and regional financial arrangements
If anything, the most recent global crisis, and in particular the European experience, has underscored 
the difﬁculties associated with cooperation between regional and global safety nets. There was initially 
a clear reluctance to involve the IMF in Europe in general and in the euro area in particular. However, 
the lack of immediately actionable instruments, the slow political and institutional response in Europe, 
and the superior expertise of the IMF in addressing balance of payments crises and designing policy 
conditionality   made   its   involvement   inevitable.   This   collaboration   has   now   been   formally 
institutionalised.
In Asia, at the onset of the financial crisis, the CMI was also not in a position to play its role alone, 
therefore making other forms of support necessary, which could certainly have led to the involvement 
of the IMF had the economic situation warranted.
Similarly, in Latin America, Domenico Lombardi (2012) described how the case of Peru from 1978 to 
the 1990s illustrated alternatively a high degree of cooperation between the FLAR and the IMF (1978-
84), then a situation of conﬂict when the former became the only lender as Peru accumulated arrears 
vis-à-vis the IMF, and ﬁnally a new phase of cooperation in the 1990s under President Alberto Fujimori.
Cooperation challenges
In Europe, cooperation challenges and divergences have in reality been more widespread than is often 
reported.
In Latvia, the IMF quickly reached the conclusion that the programme would not be sustainable without 
a currency devaluation, which the European Commission opposed for economic but probably also for 
political reasons. The IMF effectively suspended disbursement for six months, which could have 
completely derailed the economics of the programme.In Ireland, the IMF had recommended and supported the Irish government in its willingness to bail in 
banks’ bondholders to strengthen the capital position of the banks without stretching public ﬁnances 
excessively. This time it was the ECB, another key stakeholder in programme design and monitoring 
(although not a financial contributor), that resisted bail-in on financial stability grounds for the rest of 
the euro area.
In Greece, the IMF realised relatively quickly that the first Greek programme would not be sustainable 
and that a form of debt reduction would be necessary. European authorities resisted it for a long time 
until a private sector involvement deal was reached in July 2011 and eventually augmented twice. The 
IMF then went on to press a form of debt forgiveness by ofﬁcial lenders in order to bring debt back to a 
more sustainable position, which was granted imperfectly in November of 2012.
In Spain, the IMF was considering the extension of the precautionary programme for a long time at the 
end of 2011 and early in 2012, but this did not gain enough political support in Europe. The situation 
deteriorated so rapidly that the suitability of a precautionary programme vanished, making way for a 
financial sector assistance programme with macroeconomic conditionality in which the IMF was not a 
formal party, although it accepted to play a role in the monitoring.
Finally, in Cyprus, the IMF and European authorities had quite divergent views in terms of both the 
deﬁnition of a sustainable debt trajectory for a small economy like Cyprus and the best way to 
restructure a banking system that for the most part had become insolvent. Hence, disagreements and 
tensions in programme design and monitoring were in reality much more the rule than the exception, 
and they were not exactly benign because they sometimes compounded divergences of views 
between European member states.
These   numerous   examples   illustrate   the   inherent   complexity   in   organising   inter-institutional 
cooperation in an ad-hoc fashion. The IMF (2013b, 22) itself recognises that “differences of views that 
arise from fundamentally differing institutional mandates and priorities will continue to pose 
challenges.” Despite these tensions and disagreements, the experience of cooperation between the 
IMF and European authorities has generally been operationally effective. But it is unclear the extent to 
which it can be replicated in other regions.Policymakers outside Europe, and in Asia in particular, remain of the view that the degree of 
cooperation attained in Europe can hardly be replicated in other parts of the world and would lead to 
much more confrontational situations. The experiences of the Latin American and Asian crises leave 
the overwhelming impression that regional views would not be heard in particular because of the 
governance of the IMF, in which emerging economies are in a minority and are largely absent from 
senior management. In addition, because emerging economies cannot print a global reserve currency 
to ﬁnance their adjustment process, their dependency on global financial safety nets would always be 
far   greater   than   that   of   Europe.   The   challenges   standing   before   effective   cooperation   are 
multidimensional. They range from conditionality to programme ﬁnancing by way of surveillance. In 
this sense Europe has enjoyed a relatively unique set of economic and political circumstances that 
have probably provided a lot of room for negotiation and made cooperation between regional safety 
nets and the IMF far smoother and more balanced than it can be in any other region of the world.
Conditionality and programme design
Conditionality is at the heart of every adjustment programme. It is also essential to devise effective 
and credible qualiﬁcation criteria for ex ante liquidity support. In most cases, it is perceived as both a 
deterrent meant to steer governments away from unsustainable economic policies and as a corrective 
instrument to adjust economic imbalances. Yet the rise of regional arrangements can be explained by 
tensions surrounding conditionality – which was rightly or wrongly regarded as inadequate. The 
Independent Evaluation Ofﬁce of the IMF (2003) itself highlighted a number of deﬁciencies of IMF 
conditionality, in particular its expansion into policy areas that were neither critical nor directly linked 
to the success of the adjustment programme. On the other hand, the introduction of regional actors 
with competing conditionality should not be an occasion to weaken and distort IMF conditionality to a 
point that it undermines the effectiveness and success of associated programmes.
This calls for a real clariﬁcation of the division of labour between the global and regional arrangements. 
The early evaluation by the IMF (2013c) of the Greek programme and the objections it engendered 
from the European Commission, as well as an early assessment of programmes in Greece, Portugal, 
and Ireland by Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir, and Guntram Wolff (2013), allow for drawing some 
lessons learned about governance and programme design with regional financial arrangements and 
the IMF. The European experience is also particularly interesting in the sense that the IMF evolved from 
being a majority lender in Hungary to a relatively small contributor in Cyprus in a framework that, at least formally, did not lead to evident weakening of policy conditionality. The IMF (2013c) also 
highlighted important lessons learned for programme design that could actually justify a stronger 
engagement with regional arrangements and some complementarity. Indeed, lack of ownership of 
reforms and institutional weaknesses were considered important sources of programme failure—
areas where regional arrangements might have a comparative advantage. But this issue of the linkages 
of conditionality remains very controversial.
In the case of Europe, linkages with IMF conditionality are tight and mandatory, but Europe in principle 
has important leverage over the IMF because of the latter’s governance structure, which creates some 
symmetry in their relations. This is not the case for other regional groupings. In the case of Asia, for 
example, the CMIM is gradually reducing the proportion of its lending that requires linkage to IMF 
programmes. Whether the ultimate target for the IMF-delinked portion should be zero is an unsettled 
issue. Considering that links to IMF programmes are generally optional in other regional financial 
arrangements, the CMIM is also moving in this direction, gradually reducing its formal linkages with the 
IMF commensurate with its improving surveillance capacity.
Decentralised and complementary surveillance
The European crisis has demonstrated the limits of regional as well as international surveillance, both 
of which by and large missed the importance of the fundamental financial and external imbalances 
that were building up in a number of economies. A real and comprehensive post mortem of 
surveillance capacities has not yet been undertaken, although Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Wolff (2011) 
highlighted how IMF surveillance suffered from substantial shortcomings in the years preceding the 
crisis despite the existence of formal surveillance instruments.
 
As shareholders of the IMF, countries are subject to regular bilateral IMF surveillance. However, 
regional arrangements are also developing their own surveillance apparatus. To the extent that 
surveillance is inextricably linked to programme conditionality, regional financial arrangements have 
to  develop  strong independent surveillance  capacity  using  local  and  regional  knowledge  to 
complement the IMF’s global surveillance. This will in turn prove key to establishing the regional 
conditionality framework, which can be combined with IMF conditionality in cases of programme 
coﬁnancing.At the regional level, over the last decade the European Commission had probably devised the most 
expansive and intrusive machinery for conducting macroeconomic surveillance combining outcome 
as well as policy analysis and recommendations. Yet the crisis has shown its relative ineffectiveness, 
which raises very important questions about the trust and conﬁdence that should be granted to 
surveillance in general and regional surveillance in particular. Profound ongoing changes to the 
economic governance framework – including constitutional ﬁscal rules, a system risk board, and other 
far-reaching preventive and corrective mechanisms – could signiﬁcantly improve surveillance and 
monitoring by the European regional financial arrangements. Whether that will actually happen 
remains to be seen.
Against the backdrop of the European experience, the nascent surveillance apparatus in Asia appears 
extremely modest. Having been established only in April 2011, the AMRO is still in the process of 
building up its capacity. Currently, its relatively small stafﬁng may not seem sufﬁcient to effectively 
meet its mandate
15, which is “to prepare quarterly consolidated reports on the overall macroeconomic 
assessment of the region as well as on individual countries.” During a time of crisis the mandate is “to 
provide an analysis of the economic and financial situation of the CMIM Swap Requesting Country; to 
monitor the use and impact of the funds disbursed under the CMIM Agreement; and monitor the 
compliance by the CMIM Swap Requesting Country with any lending covenants to the CMIM 
Agreement
16. In the interim, partnering with the IMF in the ﬁeld of surveillance may be necessary while 
AMRO continues to strengthen its capacity.
Beyond Europe and Asia, building regional surveillance institutions with very different levels of 
analytical capacity and political backing raises important issues, particularly in terms of the potential 
division of labour between regional and global surveillance. It is not clear what part of surveillance 
would be best undertaken at the regional or at the global level.
What appears clear, however, is that surveillance of regional blocs covered by regional financial safety 
nets should be under scrutiny by the IMF, as is the case with the European Monetary Union. Whether 
15 The AMRO is governed by an executive committee composed of deputy ﬁnance ministers and central bank heads of 
member economies. The committee provides the general direction for the entire institution and is responsible for 
designating the members of the advisory panel and the AMRO director. The advisory panel, on the other hand, comprises six 
representatives from the member states: one each from the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and three from ASEAN. It 
generally gives technical, strategic, and professional guidance to AMRO but is independent from AMRO staff members (Hill 
and Menon 2012). The AMRO director is the top technocrat of the institution and is in charge of overseeing speciﬁc 
organization functions that are presently carried out by 12 professional staff, two technical assistants, and ﬁve 
administrative staff (Siregar and Chabchitrchaidol 2013).
16 See the AMRO website at www.amro-asia.org (accessed on July 1, 2013).this means that country surveillance should first and foremost be undertaken at the regional level is 
unclear. One objective of regional surveillance is to introduce checks and balances and alternative 
views from that of the IMF. One should consider, however, that strong country surveillance at the 
regional level is a necessary consequence of financial solidarity at the regional level. However, one 
should establish clearer responsibility for IMF surveillance of regional arrangements in order to ensure 
their robustness and credibility, especially in a context where the IMF is expected to be a ﬁnancing 
partner.
Multi-layered and multi-stakeholder lending framework
In principle, if regional arrangements were solid and effective, they would be able to take care of small 
shocks that do not have global repercussions. A real multi-stakeholder lending framework would only 
become necessary in cases where interregional spillovers are large and ﬁnancing needs potentially 
exceed regional capacity. The nature of the crisis, depending on whether the shocks are external or 
home-grown, could also help determine the extent to which support from global financial safety nets is 
required from both a ﬁnancing and conﬁdence point of view. The question is whether the IMF should 
become a coﬁnancier in each national programme or whether it should instead provide either lending 
or guarantees to the regional financial arrangement. There are pros and cons to both approaches. One 
interesting paradox is that even though the development of regional financial safety nets reﬂects at 
least in part some dissatisfaction with multilateral assistance as provided by the IMF, all regional 
arrangements remain more or less tied to the requirements of IMF-supported programmes. In 
particular, the recent European experience has shown that the share of ﬁnancing was not a decisive 
factor in the respective weight of institutions in the decision-making process pertaining to programme 
design and monitoring. Indeed, despite the declining share of IMF ﬁnancing over time—down to being 
nil in Spain and symbolic in Cyprus – the IMF’s judgement and conditionality did not decline in relative 
importance.
The organisation of a real multi-layered ﬁnancing arrangement remains in its infancy, partly because 
regional financial safety nets have somewhat different structures, resources, and constraints, and 
partly because the establishment of new instruments by the IMF requires more operational thinking 
about their imbrication with regional arrangements. As a general rule, regional financial safety nets 
have limited information on cross-regional linkages and international spillovers that can probably be 
duly internalised only by the IMF.There are a couple of ways to pursue joint lending between a global and regional financial safety net. 
One is through a joint lending system ensuring that each country receiving financial assistance, even if 
primarily from a regional safety net, sees a portion of ﬁnancing coming from a global safety net so as 
to ensure comparable treatment across the world and thereby limit spillovers. The second approach is 
a much more decentralised system in the form of a reinsurance/guarantee of the regional financial 
safety net. In this model, responsibility for managing balance of payments or financial crises in a 
country party to a regional financial safety net would fall squarely on the safety net itself, thereby 
creating   incentives   for   strong   surveillance,   credible   lending   capacity,   and   effective   lending 
instruments.
These two polar alternatives may not be realistic at least in the current transitory phase. In the medium 
to long term, one might prefer a scheme of reinsurance/guarantee of regional financial safety nets in 
order to align incentives and responsibilities. But in the transition period, it is probably more 
appropriate and realistic to think of a hybrid system that organises both complementarity and 
subsidiarity through a ﬁnancing system that would enable both the IMF and the regional safety net 
agency to channel capital directly to the country receiving the assistance. This would not preclude a 
regional financial safety net from lending on its own to a handful of members if the crisis appears small 
and contained, with no immediate or foreseen region-wide or international consequences. However, if 
the shock hits the entire region, this would be beyond the capabilities of regional financial safety nets, 
and global financial safety nets should be called upon to participate alongside the regional ones. The 
global safety net could lend directly to the regional one, rather than only to member countries. This 
might reduce the individual stigma effect for each country and increase the leverage of the IMF in the 
functioning of the regional financial safety nets and associated internal redistributional issues.
The outline of this joint ﬁnancing system raises a number of potential issues, not the least of which is 
the fact that the IMF’s Articles of Agreement as they are today do not allow lending to any but a 
shareholding country. Hence, legally speaking, the IMF could only backstop regional arrangements if it 
lends collectively to individual shareholding countries directly. Lending directly to the regional 
arrangements would require a change in the Articles of Agreement and would also require the regional 
financial safety net to establish joint responsibility for such lending.More importantly, if the regional financial safety net is not an entity with enough centralisation of 
economic prerogatives, the ability to impose conditionality is limited. Even in the context of a relatively 
integrated monetary union like the euro area, not all policies are sufﬁciently centralised for 
conditionality to be applied to the euro area as a whole without the signature of binding letters of intent 
in all member states. This could probably be even more complex in regional arrangements with lighter 
degrees of economic and political integration like those covered by the CMIM, the FLAR, or the AMF.
 
Cooperation with other stakeholders
Beyond the issue of coordination between regional and global financial safety net arrangements, 
history has proven that other stakeholders could be involved in a more systematic manner, especially 
in the context of precautionary programmes where conﬁdence and coordination are as important as 
the ﬁnancing and the adjustment policies themselves. Two particular important stakeholders come to 
mind:   central   banks,   given   their   involvement   in   establishing   and   operating   currency   swap 
arrangements, and regional development banks.
Central banks and currency swap arrangements
As discussed previously, bilateral swaps can be quite effective in restoring financial market 
conﬁdence and preventing a benign liquidity shortage from becoming a solvency issue. However, such 
swaps are often carried out on an ad hoc basis, and political uncertainties can hamper their 
effectiveness. One intuitive way of addressing this issue, as Edwin Truman (2010, 2011) has 
suggested, would be to have the IMF coordinate swap agreements with major central banks so that it 
can use the resources in case of a global liquidity shock. This idea was actively promoted by the IMF 
and the Korean presidency of the G-20, but the central banking community expressed reluctance on 
grounds of central bank independence and moral hazard.
Another option, beyond the IMF and taking into account the concerns of the central banking 
community, would be for the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to ensure coordination to 
establish a transparent and accountable mechanism to decide on such liquidity assistance. This forum 
would allow some discretion by central banks while ensuring that international demands and 
externalities related to global financial stability are duly considered.Indeed, there is today no framework to ensure that the issuers of global reserve currencies are 
compelled to deliver temporary and targeted liquidity provisions where and when necessary. The 
framework for SDR allocation is a more modest second-order option to drive global monetary 
aggregates, but it does not address very short-term tensions as effectively as currency swap 
arrangements. One might consider either a more multilateral process involving the IMF for the supply 
of SDR, considered as medium-term global liquidity, and the BIS for emergency liquidity provisions, or 
an approach centred on the IMF both for the supply of SDR and coordination of swap agreements.
Regional development banks, programme support, and coordination mechanisms
Both the Asian experience in 1997 and, maybe more convincingly, the Eastern European experience in 
2009, showed the importance of actively managing the liquidity/rollover risk.
 
In response to the Asian crisis, for example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) resumed its lending to 
the Republic of Korea and signiﬁcantly raised the volume of lending to Indonesia and Thailand. About 
$7.1 billion in total crisis support was approved for these three countries, three-quarters of which was 
disbursed as programme loan tranches over a 14-month period beginning in December 1997. In 
addition, the release of programme loans was accelerated to ensure the availability of funds for 
liquidity/balance of payments support when most needed, and to help avoid a further deterioration of 
economic conditions (ADB, 2009).
Similarly, in response to the global financial crisis, ADB established the $3 billion Countercyclical 
Support Facility (CSF) in June 2009 as a time-bound budget support instrument to provide more 
effective countercyclical aid. This facility is in addition to ADB’s regular loan and technical assistance 
products for crisis response. In 2009, ADB approved $2.5 billion in CSF assistance to ﬁve countries: 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Much of the increase in ADB’s crisis-
related lending of $5.08 billion in 2008–09 came through the CSF. ADB also expanded the Trade 
Finance programme (TFP) in March 2009 by raising the exposure limit from $150 million to $1 billion 
to improve access to trade ﬁnance. Overall, ADB assistance to sovereign and non-sovereign borrowers 
(excluding the TFP) grew by 28 percent in 2009 (ADB, 2011).
In Europe, the Vienna Initiative played an important role in coordinating European banks’ involvement 
in Eastern Europe and avoiding uncooperative behaviour that could have plunged Eastern Europe into dire straits. With external imbalances being completely ﬁnanced by European banks, withdrawal or 
reduced commitments by those banks to their branches and subsidiaries could have precipitated a 
dramatic balance of payments crisis. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
along with the European Investment Bank initiated an important coordination effort with the private 
sector to ensure the rollover of commitments to the region. To this end, the EBRD developed both a 
commitment framework for the private sector and a monitoring mechanism, while mobilising financial 
resources to help banks roll over their exposure. This approach became an integral part of programme 
ﬁnancing in certain countries and proved a very useful way to leverage resources of regional 
development banks with private sector commitments.
It is unclear, however, whether regional development banks are necessarily the most appropriate 
institutions to undertake this coordination effort and enforce it globally. And it is not clear whether the 
relative success of the Vienna Initiative can be replicated in a different context where bank ﬁnancing 
does not dominate capital ﬂows. However, the importance of having a forum for negotiating with the 
financial sector beyond questions of rollover has been demonstrated several times, particularly in a 
context where no formal sovereign debt restructuring mechanism is in place. Clearly in the case of 
Greece, the tacit agreement by banks to maintain their exposure to Greece was imperfectly respected 
and the subsequent private sector involvement was negotiated with an  ad-hoc  bondholders 
committee effectively spearheaded by the Institute of International Finance (IIF).
Given the importance of these negotiations, either in a purely coordinating context or in the more 
binding context of an exchange offer with consequences for creditors, it is essential to set out more 
formal and effective negotiation and coordination devices. Regional development banks along with 
regional arrangements can surely play an important role in this context.
Conclusion
Financial globalisation, driven by liberalisation and the internationalisation of supply chains, has 
increased the integration of economies around the world, in both real and financial terms. This very 
fact increases the need for a strong and effective financial safety net architecture. The shortcomings of 
global financial safety nets have repeatedly been met by additional regional financial arrangements 
that have sprouted organically across the globe since the 1970s but take very different shapes and 
forms. The IMF and the G-20 have now recognised that regional arrangements are a force that can no longer be ignored or avoided, and the European crisis has probably played a decisive role in this new 
state of affairs. But despite tentative guidelines and principles for effective cooperation, much remains 
to be done.
The ability of regional and global arrangements to cooperate in a positive and balanced manner 
appears inextricably linked to two fundamental issues: first, the governance of the IMF and the voting 
quota of emerging-market economies; and second, the ability to self-insure via recourse to a global 
reserve currency. In other words, an international monetary system resting on strong regional 
currencies would allow a form of balance that a unipolar international monetary system can probably 
not produce even with optimal cooperation between regional and international arrangements.
This links the cooperation debate to two slow-burning issues: IMF governance and the future shape of 
the international monetary system. The former is being slowly addressed by ongoing quota reform at 
the IMF, which could be an initial step in the long road toward more balanced governance. The latter is 
still relatively uncertain and depends on the success of the euro as an alternative international 
currency or on the potential for the renminbi to establish itself as a regional and then global reserve 
currency, thereby contributing to an international monetary system less dependent on one or two 
reserve currencies.
In addition, understanding of financial crises has evolved tremendously since the 1980s. In particular, 
it is now clear that financial crises can be the result of mismanaged liquidity crises and that they can 
therefore hit “innocent bystanders.” This calls for instruments that are more pre-emptive in nature and 
that prevent situations in which relatively benign liquidity shortages spin into full-blown solvency 
crises. Important steps in this direction have been taken since 2009 by the IMF, but more can be done, 
particularly by strengthening and widening currency swap arrangements and making them more 
systematic, predictable, and transparent.
Finally, the recognition that regional financial arrangements are an important feature of the future 
international monetary order requires bold efforts on both sides to improve cooperation. This probably 
means revising the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to allow lending directly to regional arrangements, 
provided   they   can   contribute   meaningfully   to   enhanced   surveillance   and   ensure   smoother 
cooperation. It also requires regional financial arrangements to think beyond their regional interest and 
organise their structures in a way that facilitates cooperation with the IMF, in particular when it comes to surveillance and programme design and monitoring. This last point is particularly important to avoid 
regionalism turning against international cooperation and leading to a form of introversion that would 
be unhealthy for global economic and monetary cooperation.
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Date Form Size,
(billions 
of US 
dollars) 
Member 
countries 
Linked 
with IMF 
(percent) 
Notes
1977 ASEAN  Swap 
Arrangement 
(ASA) 
0.1 ASEAN-5
a 0    Contribution: $20 million each 
  Maximum swap maturity: one, two, or three months, renewable 
once for three months 
  Source of swap funds:  equal shares by nonrequesting members, 
except when financially unable to provide their share 
  Swap amount: based on gearing ratio of 1:2 
 Validity:  one  year 
1978–99 ASA  0.2  ASEAN-5  0    Contribution : $40 million each 
2000 Chiang  Mai 
Initiative (CMI)
b-
ASA 
1.0 ASEAN-
10
c 
0    Contribution: $150 million each for Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; $60 million for 
Viet Nam; $20 million for Myanmar; $15 million for Cambodia; $5 
million for Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) 
  Max swap maturity: six months 
  Swap amount: twice the contribution 
 Validity:  two  years 
May 2005  CMI-ASA  2.0  ASEAN-
10 
0    Contribution: $300 million each for Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; $120 million for 
Viet Nam; $40 million for Myanmar; $30 million for Cambodia; $10 
million for Lao PDR 
  Swap maturities: one, two, three, or six months; rollover period of 
not more than six months inclusive of the initial swap period 
2002–09 CMI-Bilateral 
Swap and 
Repurchase 
Agreement 
17.0–
90.0 
ASEAN-
10+3
d 
90–80
e    6 to 26 bilateral swap and repurchase agreements, with some  
bilateral swaps outside the CMIM remaining in place 
  Maximum swap maturity (not IMF-linked): 180 days (90 days, 
renewable once for another 90 days) 
  IMF-linked swap maximum maturity: two years (90 days, renewable 
seven times) 
  A review of the CMI resulted in the following enhancements: (a) 
integration of surveillance mechanism (i.e., the ASEAN+3 Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue) into the CMI; (b) adoption of a 
collective decision making mechanism as a first step toward 
multilateralization; (c) significant increase in fund size; and (d) 
increase in the IMF delinked portion from 10% to 20%. 
May 2008  CMI  At least  ASEAN- 80    Agreements reached on contributions, borrowing accessibility, Multilateralization 
(CMIM)
f 
80.0  10+3  activation mechanism, and other elements 
  Consensus not yet reached on concrete conditions for borrowing 
eligibility and contents of covenants specified in borrowing 
agreements 
February 2009  CMIM  120.0  ASEAN-
10+3 
80    Agreement to establish an independent surveillance unit 
  No consensus yet on main components 
March 2010  CMIM  120.0  ASEAN-
10+3 and  
Hong 
Kong, 
China 
80    Commitment: 20 percent by ASEAN and 80 percent by +3 
economies 
  Borrowing quota: contribution x borrowing multiplier 
  Maximum swap maturity: 90 days but can be rolled over seven 
times 
  Coordinating countries: one from ASEAN, one from +3 economies 
  Requirements for drawing request: completion of economic and 
financial situation review, compliance with periodic surveillance 
report, and participation in the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and 
Policy Dialogue 
  Exemption from contributing to a swap request is only possible after 
approval of an executive level decision-making body 
 Validity:  five  years 
  Agreement on all elements of ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research 
Office 
  Agreement to improve  Economic Review and Policy Dialogue  
process 
May 2012  CMIM  240.0  ASEAN-
10+3 and 
Hong 
Kong, 
China 
70    Maturity (full amount): extended from 90 days to one year (with two 
renewals) 
  Supporting period: extended from two to three years 
  Maturity of the IMF-delinked portion: extended from 90 days to six 
months (with three renewals) 
  Support period of the IMF-delinked portion: extended from one to 
two years 
  Crisis resolution function renamed as the CMIM Stability Facility 
  CMIM precautionary line—a crisis prevention facility was introduced    
a.  ASEAN-5 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
b.  The CMI was signed in May 2000. 
c.   ASEAN-10 includes the ASEAN-5 plus Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam. 
d.  +3 includes the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
e.  The IMF delinked portion was increased from 10 percent to 20 percent in May 2005 and to 30 percent in May 2012. 
g.  ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was established and started operation in May 2011. 
Notes: The ASA remained in effect even after the operationalization of the CMIM (BSP 2012). Hong Kong, China is a party to the CMIM agreement 
but its borrowing capacity is limited to the IMF-delinked portion of the swap line, since it is not a member of the IMF. 
Sources: AMRO (2009) (see also the AMRO website at www.amro-asia.org; ASEAN (1977, 1978, 1981, 1982, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 
2012, 2013); BSP (2012); Henning (2002); Hill and Menon (2012); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2005); and Sussangkarn (2011). Annex Table 2 European regional financial safety nets, 1970–2012 
Date Form  Size  Member  countries  Conditio
nality 
Link with 
IMF  Other 
1970  Short-Term Monetary Support 
(STMS) 
 European  Economic 
Community (EEC) 
No No   
1971 Medium-Term  Financial 
Assistance (MTFA) 
  EEC  Yes  No  Credits are up to two years but 
the facility was amended and 
expanded on several occasions 
through the 1970s and 1980s. It 
needed a decision of the 
European Council to be 
activated and involved policy 
conditionality. 
1973 European  Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (also known 
by its French acronym, 
FECOM). The Fund also came 
to manage the STMS. 
  EEC. Note that the 
central banks of 
Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United 
Kingdom became 
party to the Fund 
although they were 
not part of the EEC 
yet 
  No  The European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund was 
established shortly after the 
agreement on the “currency 
snake” (1972) and was designed 
to operate the underlying 
agreement between central 
banks, in particular its very 
short-term financing facility, 
which effectively arranged for 
the settlement of currency 
interventions. The Fund, whose 
Secretariat was the Bank for 
International Settlements, was 
tasked with coordinating and 
undertaking concerted 
interventions and arranging for 
the settlement between the 
central banks. 
1975  Community Loan Mechanism  6 billion 
ECU 
expanded 
to 8 billion 
ECU in 
1985 
EEC  Yes  No  Initially created in response to 
the first oil shock.  
1979  Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) 
ERM 
members 
EEC  Yes  No  With the move toward the 
European Monetary System, the definition of the ECU became a 
key feature of monetary 
cooperation in Europe. This 
ought to be supported by a 
strengthening of the FECOM 
and by the development of 
short-term credit facilities, 
implying increased and more 
automatic interventions by 
central banks to support the 
agreed central parity. 
1992  Balance of Payments 
Assistance Facility 
€12 billion   All EEC countries 
until the 
establishment of the 
euro 
Yes  No  This facility was a relic of ERM 
days but was used once for Italy 
and left dormant until it was 
used again in Hungary in 2008. 
1994  European Monetary institute    Countries party to 
the ERM2 
No  No  The European Monetary 
Institute coordinated foreign 
exchange interventions and 
settlements. 
2009  Expansion of the Balance of 
Payments Assistance Facility 
€50 billion  Non-euro-area 
members of the 
European Union 
Yes Not 
necessarily 
In consideration of expanding 
needs in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The facility was raised 
first to €25 billion and then to 
€50 billion. 
2009  Vienna Initiative. Gradually 
expanded in size and scope to 
become the European Banks 
Coordination Initiative (EBCI), 
which involves the European 
Commission 
€25 billion  EBRD country of 
operations—Central 
and Eastern Europe 
No Not 
necessarily 
The Vienna Initiative was started 
in February with only €25 billion 
of commitments from multilateral 
development banks. The 
initiative was expanded and 
renamed in 2010 the European 
Banking Coordination Initiative. 
2010  Bilateral Support Lines (set up 
for the first Greek program) 
€90 billion  From all 17 euro 
area governments 
to Greece 
Yes  Yes  In the absence of existing 
instruments to provide balance 
of payments assistance. Euro-
area countries were forced to 
resort to bilateral loans in 
addition to IMF support. 
2010 European  Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism 
(EFSM) 
€60 billion  All members of the 
European Union 
Yes  Yes  Given the shortcomings of 
bilateral loans, it was decided to 
create a facility backed by the 
European budget. 
2010  European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) 
€440 
billion 
17 members of the 
euro area 
Yes  Yes  Given the small size of the 
European budget, euro area member states decided to set up 
an intergovernmental body to 
replace bilateral loans. The 
facility was meant to be 
temporary and limited to the life 
of the exceptional loans it was 
providing. 
2010  Securities Market Programme 
(unconditional but limited ECB 
interventions) 
Limited (in 
effect €200 
billion) 
Only countries of 
euro area were 
eligible. In practice, 
it was only used in 
Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal, 
and Italy 
No  No  Financial distress highlighted the 
need for the ECB to be able to 
backstop sovereign debt 
markets. ECB set this up with 
this objective but failed to 
stabilize sovereign debt 
markets. 
2011  European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) 
€500 
billion 
All members of the 
euro area 
Yes  Yes  It was decided to make the 
EFSF permanent and this was 
the permanent version, which 
allowed for temporarily 
combining the three facilities 
and raising the level of total 
useable resources to almost €1 
trillion. 
2012  Open Market Transactions 
(conditional ECB interventions 
on sovereign debt markets) 
Potentially 
Unlimited 
All members of the 
euro area but only 
applicable to 
countries under an 
ESM adjustment 
program 
Yes, 
indirectly 
Yes to the 
extent that 
the ESM 
does 
Most of the safety nets created 
during the crisis were budgetary 
in nature and had therefore 
limited resources. Growing 
financial fragmentation that 
risked tearing apart the 
monetary union eventually 
forced the ECB to announce a 
plan opening the door to 
potentially unlimited 
interventions in sovereign debt 
markets. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
  